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NOTE
LOOK OUT STATES ... YOUR ENVIRONMENTAL
LIABILITY COULD BE BIGGER THAN YOU THINK

PREVIEW
The Supreme Court decided two issues in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co.' Can Congress, exercising its powers under the Commerce Clause,
abrogate the states' immunity from suit by citizens in federal court as
prescribed in the Eleventh Amendment? Second, did Congress perform
such an abrogation in the Superfund Act? Both questions were answered
affirmatively, allowing plaintiff Union Gas Co. to continue its suit against
Pennsylvania in federal district court. This decision will have little effect
on the other major environmental statutes.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1978, the Union Gas Company acquired, through a merger, land in
Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania. The prior owners had operated a coal gassification plant there from 1890 to 1948.2 Applying the state-of-the-art
technology of the time, 3 the plant buried coal tar, a waste product, at the
site. The State of Pennsylvania 4 acquired the land in 1980. That year,
while proceeding with a flood control project, the State's excavators struck
the deposits of coal tar. Coal tar seeped into Brodhead creek.'
Acting under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), the Superfund statute, 6 the
Environmental Protection Agency determined that the tar was a hazardous
substance and initiated a Superfund clean-up.' The state and federal authorities together cleaned up the site at a cost of $720,000. The Federal
Government then reimbursed Pennsylvania for its share of the costs.'
In 1983, federal authorities sued the Union Gas Company in federal
district court pursuant to Section 9607 of CERCLA for the costs of the
I. 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
2. United States v. Union Gas Co., 792 F.2d 372, 374 (3d Cir. 1986).
3. Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989) (No, 87-1241).
4. Pennsylvania is referred to throughout this note as a state, not a commonwealth, for the purposes
of clarity and uniformity in the discussion of the Eleventh Amendment,
5. 792 F.2d 372, 374.
6. 42 U.SC. §§9601-9675 (1988).
7. United States v. Union Gas Co., 792 F2d 372, 374 (3d Cir. 1986)
8. Id.
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clean-up because the company was a prior owner of the site.9 The company
filed a third party complaint against Pennsylvania, claiming that the State,
included in the definition of "person" in Section 9601, was also liable
under Section 9607 because it was the current owner of the site. Pennsylvania motioned for and was granted dismissal on the grounds that the
Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution precluded the suit of a
state in federal court by a citizen."0 During the appeals, Congress amended
CERCLA with the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 (SARA)," which the courts then used in determining Congress'
intent regarding CERCLA.
In its decision, the Supreme Court issued five opinions, splitting on
the decision of both issues. There was no majority opinion. However,
on the question of statutory interpretation, Justices Brennan, Stevens,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Scalia were convinced that Congress had sufficiently expressed its intention to waive state sovereign immunity, while
the others disagreed. ' In separate opinions, Justices Brennan and Stevens
confirmed that Congress was within the bounds of its Article I power in
waiving the immunity of the states. Justices Marshall and Blackmun
joined in Brennan's opinion. " Justice White, agreeing with Brennan's
result, was the fifth justice who found this congressional power to exist. "
Justice Scalia, dissenting on the constitutional issue, wrote to the contrary,
finding it beyond Congress' power to waive the states' sovereign immunity. He was joined by Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, and O'Connor. 5
Justice O'Connor also wrote a separate dissenting opinion.' 6
BACKGROUND OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
Controversy surrounds the understanding and intent of the Framers in
1787 regarding the power of the new federal courts to hear cases involving
states. The different opinions from Union Gas reflect this debate. Article
9. United States v. Union Gas Co., 575 F.Supp. 949 (1983), aff'd, 792 F.2d 372 (1986), vacated,
Union Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania, 479 U.S. 1025 (1986) (remanded to the third circuit for reconsideration in light of amendments to CERCLA), rev'd, United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d
1343 (3d Cir. 1987), affd, Union Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania, 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
10. 575 F Supp. 949.
I. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (incorporated into 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9675
(1988)).
12, 109 S.Ct. at 2276, 2295.
13, Id. at 2276, 2286.
14. Union Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania, 109 S.Ct. 2273, 2289 (1989).
15. Id. at 2295.
16. Id. at 2303.
17. "[Tihe weight of the evidence is against those scholars who assert that the bar in the 1790's
generally assumed the existence of state sovereign immunity." Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment
and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. Law. Rev. 1889, 1899 (1983). But
see Pennsylvania v.Union Gas Co., 109 S.Ct. 2273 at 2297 (1989). "The evidence is strong that
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III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution confers jurisdiction to the federal
courts in several ways. There is the "arising under" type, bearing on all
cases arising out of Constitutional or federal law. Jurisdiction is also
granted in cases of "diversity" of the parties, including cases involving
a state and another state, a citizen of another state, a foreign state, or
foreign citizens. IS
The meaning of these grants was tested early in the nation's history in
Chisholm v. Georgia.9 In 1792, a citizen of South Carolina sued the
State of Georgia in federal court on an assumpsit action, claiming diversity
jurisdiction. The Court recognized this action because it fell squarely
within the text of Article III, Section 2.20 Congress was displeased with
that application. The members of that Congress (not necessarily the Framers of the Constitution) had contemplated that Article III's grant gave
a federal forum to citizens who were sued by a state, but not the reversethat citizens could turn around and sue states in that same forum. Congress
sought to prevent the recurrence of another suit like Chisholm by passing
the Eleventh Amendment. 2 The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens
or subjects of any foreign state. 22
A literal reading of the Amendment denies federal jurisdiction wherever
a state is sued by citizens of another or foreign state. Notably, the drafters
of the Amendment did not specifically preclude citizens from suing their
own states.
Because the Amendment's language so closely mirrors that in Article
II1, Section 2, which grants diversity jurisdiction, it is quite natural to
infer that the Amendment's bar would apply only to diversity cases, not
to cases involving questions of federal or constitutional law (federal questions). Chisholm had involved diversity jurisdiction, not a federal question. But did Congress mean to also bar suits against states involving
federal questions when it reacted to Chisholm?
The Supreme Court faced just that issue nearly 100 years after Congress
passed the Eleventh Amendment in Hans v. Louisiana.23 A citizen of
Louisiana sued that state in federal court on the theory that Louisiana
the jurisdictional grants in Article fit of the Constitution did not automatically eliminate underlying
state sovereign immunity ...." See also Welch v. Tex. Highways and Pub. Transp. Dept., 483 U.S.
468, 483-484 (1987).
18. Other bases for jurisdiction also exist, such as admiralty. U.S. Const. art. Ill, § 2.
19. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
20. Id.
21. Gibbons, supra note 17, at 1920.
22. U.S. Const. amend. Xl.
23. 134 U.S. 1 (1889).
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had breached Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution by relieving
itself of an obligation secured by a contract, thus creating a federal
question. 4 Although neither Article III nor the Eleventh Amendment
addressed the situation of a citizen suing his own state, the Supreme Court
dismissed the suit, holding that sovereign immunity was meant to apply
to a state's own citizens in exactly the same manner as it does to foreign
citizens. More importantly, the Court also held that not even a federal
question triggered federal jurisdiction where a citizen sued a state without
the state's consent.2 5 This holding was faithful to the literal language of
the Amendment with respect to the words that bar "any suit," but the
Court rationalized away the absence of words barring a suit by a state's
own citizens. Thus, this granddaddy case of Eleventh Amendment law
introduced the concept that the Amendment embodies a broad grant of
sovereign immunity to the states, a notion adopted by the Union Gas
dissenters. That notion is currently disputed by many legal scholars.26
The Civil War and the subsequent Fourteenth Amendment added a new
wrinkle to the face of the states' sovereign immunity. Section 1 placed
restrictions on the states with respect to the way states could treat United
States citizens.27 Section 5 authorized Congress to make the laws necessary to enforce Section 1 2" One way Congress eventually chose to
enforce Section I was to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and one facet
of that act was the opportunity for aggrieved citizens to sue states in
federal court.29
The constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act's unilateral abrogation of
state sovereign immunity was tested in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer A Connecticut resident sued his own state for a violation of the Civil Rights
Act. Connecticut asserted immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion which held that the Fourteenth
Amendment gave power to Congress at the expense of the states and that
the concept of state sovereign immunity was necessarily limited by Section 5, the enforcement section, of the Fourteenth Amendment. That
opinion, without dissent, recognized that Congress has the power to
dissolve state sovereign immunity, at least when legislating under the
Fourteenth Amendment." Thus, citizens sometimes can force unconsenting states into federal court.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2286, n. I. See, e.g., Marshall, Fighting words of the Eleventh Amendment,
102 Harv. L. Rev. 1342 (1989); Jackson, The Supreme Court. the Eleventh Amendment. and State
Sovereign Immunity, 98 Yale L.J. 1425 (1988).
27. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § I.
28. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §5.
29. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 101(d), 78 Stat. 241, 242 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c), § 2000e (1988)),
30. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
31. Id.
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States have found themselves defending against citizens in federal court
in several other situations. It has always been within the power of states
to consent to being sued, where otherwise immune, in either federal or
state court. In practice, it is not often that states consent to suit in federal
court. States more frequently consent to suit in state court, realizing that
the U.S. Supreme Court can review the decision of a state court.3 2 But
consent to suit in a state court does not otherwise affect a state's immunity
in the federal courts .
Yet another way a state could face a citizen in federal court is through
the doctrine of constructive waiver. The Court recognized the validity of
this doctrine in the 1964 case Pardenv. Terminal Railway of the Alabama
State Docks Department.4 Congress had enacted the Federal Employers'
Liability Act (FELA)3" as part of the regulation of commerce. FELA
subjected any operator of a railway to liability for the injuries of railroad
workers. When an injured employee of the state-owned railway sued the
State of Alabama for damages in federal court, Alabama asserted sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court found that although the State never
expressly consented to suit, it had done so implicitly by operating a
railway for twenty years under FELA, which clearly stated that all railroad
operators were within the scope of the statute. The rationale Justice
Brennan used in writing that majority opinion was that in running a
railroad, Alabama had voluntarily entered a sphere of conduct which
Congress had plenary power to regulate, and which was ordinarily populated by individuals. Sovereign immunity was therefore not an available
defense.
A common factor in both Parden and Fitzpatrick was that Congress
had been unmistakably clear in expressing its intention to make states
potentially liable in the legislative history and, more importantly, in the
words of the statute. Justice Powell stated the "unmistakably clear expression" rule well in Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transportation.36 "Petitioner's argument fails in any event because Congress
has not expressed in unmistakable language its intention to allow States
to be sued in federal court under the Jones Act. "37 The rule exists so that
the important but delicate balance of federal and state power is not unintentionally disturbed. 8 In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,39 the
Court declined to find the required degree of clarity in the language of
32. See Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 46 (1944).
33. Id.
34. 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled in part by Welch v. Tex. Highways and Pub. Transp. Dept.,
483 U.S. 468 (1987).
35. Employers' Liability Act, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988)).
36. 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
37. Id. at 475.
38. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238-240 (1985).
39. Id.
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the federal statute purported to waive state immunity.' This was so even
though the statute was enacted under Congress' Fourteenth Amendment
powers. An even finer line was drawn in Employees of the Department
of Public Health and Welfare v. Missouri."'The Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA)42 was held to be applicable to states, but only to the extent that
the federal government, not private citizens, brought suit. The ambiguity
in the language of FLSA about who could sue a state was resolved in
favor of state sovereign immunity.43
It was not argued in Union Gas that Pennsylvania had waived, either
expressly or by its actions, sovereign immunity. Rather, the Union Gas
Co. argued that Congress had purposely precluded sovereign immunity
in CERCLA actions. CERCLA was not enacted under the Fourteenth
Amendment. This meant that if sufficiently clear congressional language
were found, the Court would decide for the first time the issue of whether
Congress can unilaterally abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to a federal question when exercising its commerce
power.'
ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
At least three ways of interpreting the Eleventh Amendment have been
suggested. The first stems from the premise that the drafters of the amendment meant exactly what the words they used say.'5 In such a literal
interpretation, the Union Gas Co., being a citizen of Pennsylvania, would
not be included in the group "citizens of another state" that was prohibited
from suing Pennsylvania. But ever since Hans, the Court has always
interpreted the Amendment to be larger than its language; a state's own
citizens, although not mentioned in the Amendment, are also barred from
suing their own state. Few legal scholars or courts have chosen to adopt
this literal interpretation, and the argument was not even made to the
Supreme Court in Union Gas.
40. Id. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-112. Title V, §504. 87 Stat. 394 (current
version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988)) imposed upon recipients of federal funds the obligation to
not discriminate against persons with physical handicaps. The Atascadero State Hospital received
federal funds.
41. 411 U.S. 280 (1973).
42. Current version at 329 U.S.C. §§201-219, 216 (1988).
43. 411 U.S. 280 (1973). See also Welch v. Tex. Highways and Pub. Transp. Dept., 483 U.S.
468 (1987). The Supreme Court found insufficient expression of congressional intention to waive
state sovereign immunity and so avoided ruling on the constitutional issue. But Welch still provided
a modem discussion of the same constitutional issue as in Union Gas. Justice Powell, writing for
the majority, said in dicta that the Hans court decided the issue correctly citizens cannot sue states,
even over a federal question. But see In re McVey Trucking, Inc., 812 F.2d 311 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, Edgar v. McVey Trucking, Inc., 484 U.S. 895 (1987) where the circuit court disposed of
the issue in a manner inconsistent with Hans and in line with the Union Gas plurality.
44. 109 S. Ct. at 2281.
45. For an elegant statement of this theory, see Marshall, supra note 26.
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The second major view is that adopted by the dissent in Union Gas,
that the Eleventh Amendment is a non-exclusive expression of the general
policy that states shall not be hauled into court by citizens without consent.
This view is not subject to attack if one adopts the premise that this is
what the Framers of the Constitution understood to exist and intended to
continue when they ratified Article III, the grants of jurisdiction to the
federal courts, and Article I, the grants of power to Congress. Those
Justices that held this premise applied it in a correct fashion to Union
Gas by calling for dismissal of the suit against Pennsylvania. '
But the Eleventh Amendment does not say "the states shall enjoy
complete sovereign immunity from suits by citizens in federal court,
except where they waive such immunity." Such wording would have left
no room for debate on the issue. The flaw in the theory of the dissent is
that in accepting it, one must ignore the striking parallel between the
Eleventh Amendment and the grant of diversity jurisdiction in Article Ill.
One must also believe that Congress, in creating the Eleventh Amendment, meant to overrule not only Chisholm's application of diversity
jurisdiction, but also any application to a federal question such as in Hans
and in Union Gas. Finally, one must, as the Hans Court did, accept a
violation of the literal language of the amendment in prohibiting citizens
from suing their own states.
Justice Scalia, writing for the dissent, noted that other remedies besides
a suit for damages were available to aggrieved citizens such as the Union
Gas Co. However, the alternatives he proposed would be of no use to
the company. One such remedy was the granting of an injunction against
the offending state official to prevent future harmful actions.4 7 Unfortunately for the Union Gas Co., an injunction from particular state action
would not relieve in any way the company's liability to the United States.
Justice Scalia's second option was a lawsuit under the Civil Rights Act,
where jurisdiction is carved out from state immunity by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 48 Again, this would offer no real relief for the Union Gas
Co. Finally, the company could rely upon the Federal Government to sue
the State, as CERCLA and SARA were assumed to allow.49 But the
Federal Government had already declined to sue Pennsylvania. In fact,
the Government reimbursed the State for the money the State spent on
the clean-up.5" If the Eleventh Amendment bars individuals (and corporations) from calling states into federal court to address -federal issues,
plaintiffs in Union Gas Co.'s situation will be left without any effective
remedy.
46. 109 S. Ct. 2273.
47. id. at 2298 Scalia, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48. Id.
49. id. at 2278, 2291.

50. United States v. Union Gas Co., 792 F.2d 372, 374 (3d Cir. 1986).
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The plurality accepted yet a third interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, one incompatible with either of the other two. The premise underlying this interpretation is that at the time of ratification, the consensus
among the Framers was that the states would surrender their immunity
to the extent that plenary lawmaking power was granted to Congress. If
Congress made a law ending sovereign immunity, the law would be valid.
The asserted meaning of the Eleventh Amendment is that the enacting
Congress meant to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts only to the
extent that diversity jurisdiction was invoked by citizens as in Chisholm.
This interpretation also requires a distortion of the amendment's literal
language. "[Any suit in law or equity'" must be taken to mean "only
suits in law or equity involving diversity jurisdiction. 2
The ability to create causes of action which include states as potential
defendants is a powerful tool for Congress and is particularly applicable
to the problem of nation-wide toxic pollution."3 Because sixteen of every
one-hundred Superfund sites are located on state-owned land, 4 Congress
can expect significantly greater compliance with CERCLA or any other
statute it chooses to imbue with this characteristic. Congress is also, of
course, free to refrain from abrogating sovereign immunity where it feels
state immunity is appropriate. It is the magnitude of this congressional
power which alarms the dissenters.
The plurality applied this third interpretation to Union Gas Co. in
reaching the correct decision, but Justice Stevens perceptively pointed
out some limitations in his concurring opinion." Stevens, like Brennan,
opined that Congress does have sufficient plenary power from its Article
I grants to enact laws which abrogate state sovereign immunity for federal
questions. Parties may not waive a defect in subject matter jurisdiction,
yet states have on occasion consented to the decision of federal questions
in federal court. This means, Stevens reasons, that in such cases, subject
matter jurisdiction does exist, and what the states actually waive is an
artificial, judicially created immunity which reflects a respect for traditional notions of Federalism. 6 This respect is also manifested in the strict
"unmistakably clear expression" rule. In cases where real subject matter
51. U.S. Const. amend. Xl.
52. Marshall, supra note 26.
53. The problem generally does not respond to local solutions. Furthermore, Congress had tried
to attack the problem before by enacting laws which included no cause of action once damage had
occurred. These attempts failed to achieve significant reductions of toxic pollution. Thus, the only
solution which Congress felt would work was to render all landowners, including states, liable. 109
S. Ct. 2273, 2284-2285.
54. Brief for Respondent at 8, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989) (No. 871241).
55. 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2286-2289 (Stevens, J._ concurring).
56. Id. at 2287.
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jurisdiction exists such as, in Justice Stevens' opinion, where a federal
question is at issue, Congress is free to set aside, by legislation, the
Court's respect-based assessment of when states should be protected from
citizens' suits. Congress did just that in CERCLA. The limitation Stevens
points out is that where true subject matter jurisdiction does not exist,
Congress can not create it because "[a] statute cannot amend the Constitution." 57 That situation would exist if Congress were to create a law
waiving state sovereign immunity related to diversity jurisdiction.
Union Gas is not a precedentially strong case. Every member of the
Union Gas plurality urged overruling Hans in Welch v. Texas Highways
and Public TransportationDepartment,5" but they were unable to do so
and instead dissented in that case. Curiously, Justice White, a member
of the Union Gas plurality, joined the majority in Welch, which declined
to overrule Hans for reasons extremely similar to those put forth by the
Union Gas dissenters. 9 His one-paragraph concurring opinion in Welch
did not address the constitutional issue present in Union Gas.' ° But in
Union Gas, Justice White said, ". . . I agree with the conclusion reached
by Justice Brennan in Part III of his opinion, that Congress has the
authority under Article I to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity
of the States, although I do not agree with much of his reasoning. "61
Without further rationale from Justice White, only he knows which difference between Welch and Hans he found to be constitutionally significant,62 and how he, the swing vote, would decide a similar issue next
time. With the justices split five to four in favor of allowing abrogation,
a Court personnel change of one person could make the difference between
overruling Hans and overruling Union Gas. In fact, the two cases are so
incompatible that either one or the other will probably be overruled within
a decade.
ANALYSIS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ISSUE
Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer63 involved the Civil Rights Act.' The Court found
that the language of that act was sufficiently clear to meet the "unmis57. Id. at 2286.
58. 483 U,S, 468 (1987).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 495. See also, Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S, 670, 702
(1982) (White, J., concurring in the judgement in part and dissenting in part).
61. 109 S. Ct. at 2295.
62. Welch was a suit in admiralty, requiring yet another contortion of the Eleventh Amendment
so as to bar not only suits at "law and equity" but also in admiralty. However, Justice White did
not discuss how the admiralty basis affected the case, 483 U.S. 468, 495 (1987).
63. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
64. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. no. 88-352, § 101(d), 78 Stat. 241, 242 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c), § 2000e (1988)).
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takably clear expression" test. The Civil Rights Act thus provides an
example of how clear is clear enough to waive sovereign immunity.
Although the original version of the act had excluded states from its
scope, later amendments removed this exclusion, added "governments"
and "political subdivisions" to the definition of "persons," and modified
the definition of "employees" to include state workers. 6' Had the final
form of the Act been what was originally passed, the required degree of
clarity might not have been found. However, because the changes were
specific, and because the Fourteenth Amendment had been aimed directly
at the states, the court found sufficient clarity. 6'
The Rehabilitation Act, 67 at issue in Atascadero State Hospitalv. ScanIon, s provided "[tihe remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section
717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" to "qualified handicapped individual[s]" so as to sue "any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance."' The Court held that even though the language of the Civil
Rights Act itself was clear enough, there was not sufficient clarity in the
Rehabilitation Act by reference to the Civil Rights Act to abrogate California's sovereign immunity.7"
Rather than defining employers to include states in the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA)," Congress defined employees to include employees of a state. The Court in Employees of the Department of Public
Health and Welfare v. Missouri72 found this language also to be insufficiently clear to pass the test (and thereby avoided the constitutional issue).
Atascaderoand Employees show that when Congress has done no more
than include states in the section of a statute that defines those to whom
the statute applies, the "unmistakably clear expression" requirement is
not met and Eleventh Amendment immunity is not abrogated. Of course,
the same test was applied to CERCLA in Union Gas.
The first section of CERCLA does include states in the definition of
"persons."' 73 The section of CERCLA about suits by citizens provides:
Any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf-( )
against any person (including ...any other governmental instru65, 427 U.S. at 449, n. 2.
66. Id. But see 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c). This subsection of the Civil Rights Act could have supported
the argument that
the definition of States as persons was meant only to put States on notice that the
U.S. Attorney General was authorized to bring civil rights actions against States. See Employees of
the Department of Public Health and Welfare v. Missouri, 411 U.S. 280 (1973).
67. 29 U.S.C. §§701-796 (1988).
68. 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985).
69. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-112, Title V,§ 504, 87 Stat. 394 (current version
at 29 U.S.C. §§701-796 (1988)); 473 U.S. at 242 (1982).
70. 473 U.S. 234.
71. 29 U.S.C. §§200-219, 203 (1988).
72. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
73. 42 U.S.C. §9601(21) (1988).

Fall 19901

PENNSYLVANIA

V. UNION GAS CO.

mentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment of the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of any
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order. .. .
The cases on the Eleventh Amendment, discussed in the previous section,
severely restrict the extent of suit permitted by the Amendment. And mere
inclusion of a state in a definition has been held insufficiently clear to
abrogate immunity. This is what the first trial and appellate courts found
in dismissing Union Gas.75
But SARA 6 added new insight as to what Congress intended CERCLA
to do. The Union Gas Co. argued that section 101(20)(D) of SARA
excluded states from liability where land is acquired passively by default,
forfeiture, or any other way that states come to own land simply through
their function as a sovereign. In this way, the company argued, Congress
demonstrated its assumption that states could be liable where they actively
acquired land, as Pennsylvania had done in Stroudsburg.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Scalia accepted
this argument. But Justice White made the better argument,7---one in
accord with Employees. His position was that in submitting states to
liability, all Congress clearly expressed was that the United States may
sue the states. 78 But White's argument did not prevail. Instead, the plurality liberalized the "unmistakably clear expression" rule contrary to
precedent and without considering the ramifications of this change.
Effect on Other Environmental Statutes
The decisions made in Union Gas about the language in CERCLA and
the power of Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity in some
cases will not affect the application of the other existing environmental
statutes. The Clean Air Act 79 contains language almost identical to that
in CERCLA. In the section entitled "Citizen suits," the act provides
any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf---l)
against any person (including ... (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the Eleventh
Amendment of the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of
any standard. .

...

.74. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (1988).
75. United States v. Union Gas Co., 575 F. Supp. 949 (1983); United States v. Union Gas Co.,
792 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1986).
76. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (incorporated into 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9675
(1988)).
77. 109 S. Ct. at 2291.
78. Id. at 2278.
79. 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7642 (1988).

80. Id. §7604 (a)(1).
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Like CERCLA, this act also included states in the definition of "persons."" The same phrase turns up again in the Clean Water Act's section
on "Citizen suits,"82 and yet again in the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA). 83 Both of these statutes also define a "person"
to include a state.84 But these are provisions which allow citizens to sue
for injunctive relief, rather than money damages, when a state exceeds
a standard. The big difference between CERCLA and the other statutes
discussed is that none of the three contains what SARA added to CERCLA,
that is, an exclusion for liability in cases where a state has, by default,
acquired a site which violates statutory standards. 5 Thus, the "unmistakably clear expression" test can not be met.
Union Gas has settled what the phrase "to the extent permitted by the
Eleventh Amendment" means. The states may be brought into federal
court by private citizens wherever Congress clearly expresses its intention
to abrogate state sovereign immunity with respect to a federal question.
Congress can express this intention by 1) including states in the definition
of persons subject to liability, 2) explicitly subjecting states to liability
to the extent allowed by the Eleventh Amendment, and 3) excluding states
from liability in certain cases, thus showing an assumption of potential
liability where not excluded.
CONCLUSION
Union Gas's effects on the overall efforts to clean up toxic pollution
are uncertain. The decision will aid in the cleaning up of spills on state
land and on private land where a state has had something to do with
generating, transporting, or depositing the waste. The case may also have
the effect of encouraging more midnight toxic dumping on state land as
private landowners wish to see waste properly disposed of but wish to
avoid the expense themselves. What is certain is that states can now
expect to face substantial new financial burdens in the forms of litigation
costs, settlements, and money judgments. Congress would do well in the
future to include in the sections of federal statutes about the liability of
states words to the effect of "state sovereign immunity is (not) hereby
abrogated and the states may (not) be sued in federal court by private
parties."
THOMAS L. HAGERMAN
81. Id. §7602(e).
82. JAlny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf against any person (including . . . (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh
amendment of the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation...." The Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1365 (a)(1) (1988).
83. The phrase is actually used twice in RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §6901-6992, §6972 (1988).
84. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (1988); 42 U.S.C. §6901-6987, 6903 (1988).
85. 42 U.S.C. §9601(20)(D) (1988). Ironically, this "limitation" exposed the states to much
more liability in Union Gas by convincing the plurality that Congress had satisfied the "unmistakably
clear expression" rule.

